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HIS IS A bold claim to make about an industry identified as
having approximately 1,300 companies, 153,000 employees
and market capitalization of $97 billion.
2 The entire biotech
industry is dwarfed by just one pharmaceutical behemoth
like Merck, which employs 53,800 at a market capitalization
of $162 billion.
3 But pharmaceutical and agrochemical giants
sense biotech’s potential to transform their industries and actively
seek partnerships with biotech innovators. Last year, biotech firm 
Millennium Pharmaceuticals signed a $465 million genomics deal
with Bayer and a separate deal with Monsanto worth up to $218 mil-
lion.
4 Just consider what has happened in agriculture since the first
genetically modified tomato went on the market in 1994. In 1999,
nearly half of the total U.S. corn, soybean and cotton acreage will be
planted with genetically modified crops.
5 More than 65 biotech drugs
and diagnostics are on the market, with hundreds more in develop-
ment. Biotech supporters sense a bonanza.
Biotech may or may not live up to predictions, but it is attracting
media attention. Although most biotech companies in the news are
far from the Lone Star State, recent headlines confirm biotech activity
in Texas. Austin-based Introgen Therapeutics made the Wall Street
T
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  “Biotech will be to the coming century what 
electronics has been for the one now passing.”
1
BIOTECHBONANZA: PROSPECTSFORTEXASJournal and Business Week short lists of
biotech companies with promising
cures for cancer. The Forbes ASAP May
1999 biotech special listed Houston’s
LifeCell Corp. as a major player in tissue
engineering.
Before the Biotech Century begins
in earnest, this article investigates bio-
tech’s presence in Texas and potential
for growth.
Biotech: Innovation and Industry
Biotech is a set of innovations revo-
lutionizing health care, food and agri-
culture, even manufacturing and environ-
mental cleanup. Biotech, the applied
knowledge of biology, is not new.
Throughout history, the production of
foods such as wine, cheese and bread
and the breeding of animals and plants
depended on rudimentary biotech.
Twentieth century advances in scien-
tists’ understanding of molecular and
cellular biology, genetics and ways the
human immune system fights disease,
coupled with computer technology, have
enabled companies to launch revolu-
tionary products.
Biotech: The Innovations. The abil-
ity to recombine genetic fragments and
the computer-enabled deciphering of
genetic code are key tools of modern
biotech. A 1973 experiment to insert a
gene from an African clawed toad into
bacterial DNA marked the beginning of
genetic engineering and eventually led
to the first Food and Drug Adminis-
tration approval of a genetically engi-
neered drug: bacteria-produced hu-
man insulin. The international Human
Genome Project, using sophisticated
gene-sequencing computers, plans to
map and sequence all human DNA by
2003. Meanwhile, Celera Genomics Corp.
plans to do for biotech what Bloomberg
did for financial data: develop and sell
access to a comprehensive, cutting-edge
database. Genetic engineering enables
scientists to change what cells do, deci-
phering of the genetic code reveals what
changes to make and access to genetic
information inspires innovation.
Biotech products today blur bound-
aries between industrial categories.
Biotech in health care harnesses the
human body’s own tools to fight dis-
ease through medicines, vaccines, tis-
sue engineering and gene therapy and
to detect disease through new and im-
proved diagnostic tests. Biotech foods
already engineered for higher quality
and nutritional content will soon be
able to deliver vaccines and hemoglo-
bin. Biotech increases crop yields with-
out the use of chemicals by making
plants immune to herbicides and toxic
only to pests—launching a second
green revolution. In manufacturing, cot-
ton grown in blue or khaki eliminates
the need for chemical dyes, and mi-
crobes grow super-resilient polyester.
Plants that produce biodegradable plas-
tics and bacteria engineered to clean up
toxic chemical spills are under develop-
ment. And as silicon microchips ap-
proach their processing-speed limit,
engineers are constructing the next gen-
eration of computer chips from DNA.
Biotech: The Industry. Because
biotech’s dramatic advances are rela-
tively new, we can still distinguish com-
panies that are using biotech to develop
pharmaceutical, agricultural or industrial
products from those that are not. In that
respect, we can discuss biotech as an
industry. Over time, competition forces
all firms to adopt the best technologies.
Just as most companies today use in-
formation technologies and are “high-
tech,” most firms in the near future
could be “biotech,” and discussing bio-
tech as an industry will be less mean-
ingful. A new industry name—life
sciences—has already been proposed,
but for now, we can talk about biotech.
Industry characteristics. Biotech’s
complex innovation process character-
izes the industry. The lifeblood of bio-
tech companies is knowledge, labor
and capital capable of enduring the
time-consuming, risky process of taking
a product to market. (See the box, “Bio-
tech’s Innovation Process.”) A new bio-
tech drug takes about 10 years to de-
velop, and just one drug in 10 success-
fully completes clinical trials.
6 Thirty
biotech agriculture products currently in
development will take up to six more
years to reach the market.
7 Biotech com-
panies rely on the latest scientific ad-
vances and require personnel who can
interpret and apply those results. Prox-
imity to universities is typical as com-
panies attempt to attract biologists—
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mental cleanup.customers, manufacturers of comple-
mentary products and even govern-
mental and other institutions such as
universities, standards agencies and voca-
tional training providers. Cluster growth
is a self-reinforcing cycle. As a single
company’s success brings new suppliers
or inspires cooperation with local insti-
tutions, other companies that can bene-
academics not usually involved in busi-
ness. Finding investors who will wait
out the product development phase is
particularly challenging for biotech
companies today. Many investors aban-
doned biotech in the mid-1990s for
higher- and quicker-return tech stocks.
In the meantime, biotech firms have
funded themselves by tapping smaller,
informed investors and licensing their
technology to larger firms.
8
Industry clusters. Biotech compa-
nies, like those in other industries, tend
to cluster around essential resources,
eventually attracting more such re-
sources to the region. A cluster is not
simply a geographic concentration of
companies; clusters include suppliers,
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Biotech’s Innovation Process
The Biotechnology Industry Organization
lobbied for the 1997 FDA Modernization Act
and achieved reforms liable to lop 19 months
off total drug development times. Other
changes include implementing fast-track 
approval designation to drugs for serious or
life-threatening conditions and allowing one
biologics license to cover both a product and
a facility.
1 Ernst & Young LLP, 13th Biotechnology Industry Annual
Report, p. 38.
2 Biotechnology Industry Organization, The 1998–99 BIO
Editors’ and Reporters’ Guide to Biotechnology,
www.bio.org.
3 William L. Warren, “Developments in Biotech Patent Law,”
Jones & Askew LLP.
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SOURCES: Introgen Therapeutics; Texas Healthcare and
Bioscience Institute; author’s research.
Taking a biotech innovation from discov-
ery to market is slow and expensive.  Biotech
innovations rely heavily on patent protection
and undergo rigorous testing by federal
agencies before they can be marketed. The
diagram outlines the biotech innovation
process for health care, which is similar to the
pharmaceutical industry’s drug discovery
process. Note the entire biotech process
typically takes 15 years, over half of which is
spent acquiring approval from the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Biotech applica-
tions in other industries also must comply
with federal regulations. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture regulates biotech food
and agriculture innovations, and industrial
and environmental innovations are often 
subject to regulations of the Environmental
Protection Agency.
Despite facing considerable time and ex-
pense, companies endure biotech’s innovation
process because of the potential for profit.
Ernst & Young identifies why companies may
be willing to be patient and persistent.
“The environment in which a bio-
technology product is launched is
quite distinct from that of typi-
cal high-technology markets. Most
products are developed upon a
strongly defensible base of intel-
lectual property, and consequently
the vast majority of new products
occupy highly specialized or even
unique niches in the market-
place.”
1
Serving unique niches enables a company 
to attain a sustainable competitive advantage
and thus profits. So even though patent 
filings and FDA approvals take time, they 
arguably strengthen an innovation’s com-
mercial viability.
Biotech and Patent Policy. The U.S.
Constitution, Article I, section 8, states that
“Congress shall have power…to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by se-
curing for limited times to authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.” The Biotechnology
Industry Organization advocates strong
patent protection for biotech inventions:
“Because biotech companies de-
pend on private investments, pat-
ents are among the first and most
important benchmarks of progress
in developing a new biotechnology
product. Patents offer limited pro-
tection against commercial use of
a company’s invention by a com-
petitor. In biotechnology, patents
are critical to raising capital to fund
the research and development of
products.”
2
Two key court cases extended patent pro-
tection to biotech innovations, but currently
biotech agriculture patent protection is under
fire. Patent attorney William Warren explains,
“Paradoxically, biotechnology-related inven-
tions are patentable in the United States only
if obtained through a non-biological process,
defined as one in which the ‘hand of man’ has
intervened.”
3 Courts established this princi-
ple in 1980 by ruling General Electric could
patent a genetically engineered oil-eating
bacterium. Recently the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed a Patent Office decision
and ruled that DNA sequences that code for
particular proteins are patentable. Plant
patents, however, are being challenged, as a
federal appeals court has taken up the issue
of plant patent legality.
Biotech and FDA Regulation. The FDA,
part of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, pursues a single objective:
consumer protection by ensuring that food,
drugs, biological products and medical de-
vices are safe. The FDA has existed since
1931, though some law enforcement func-
tions began in 1906 under the Food and Drug
Act. The FDA’s Center for Biologics Evalu-
ation and Research coordinates with the 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
to approve biotech health care products. The
approval process for biotech medicines is
estimated to cost between $200 million and
$350 million and take from seven to 12
years.
4newness makes its industry presence
even less visible to standard measures.
In the following paragraphs I assess the
presence of biotech companies by re-
gion and compare Texas statistics with
those of other areas in the United States.
I then discuss two large regional bio-
tech clusters and the emergence of such
clusters in Texas.
Biotech Companies in U.S. Re-
gions. No database tracks all publicly
traded and privately held biotech com-
panies, but industry sources reveal the
most important identities and locations
of biotech companies. Ernst & Young
has tracked public and private biotech
companies for 13 years. Chart 1 shows
the distribution of biotech companies
across the United States. Table 1 lists
the seven largest biotech companies.
The chart and table show that not only
do California and New England have
the most companies, they also have the
biggest companies. Texas has enough
companies to register on Ernst & Young’s
biotech radar, but the entire Texas pub-
lic biotech contingent is comparable 
to just one Seattle company, Immunex
Corp., in terms of employees and mar-
ket capitalization.
Ernst & Young’s database is compre-
hensive but not exhaustive; yet an alter-
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fit from those resources are drawn to
the area. Because company growth is
easier in a good business environment,
which itself is developed by the pres-
ence of other companies, clustering en-
ables companies to gain competitive 




in Texas and Beyond
Traditional statistics often overlook
industry clusters, and biotech’s relative
Chart 1
Distribution of U.S. Biotech Companies






























Distribution Detail, Public Companies by Area
Area Public companies Market capitalization* Employees
San Francisco 59 23,393 22,200
New England 52 15,274 14,615
Los Angeles 12 20,835 23,325
Seattle 13 3,771 2,067
Texas 12 695 1,063
* In millions of dollars, 1998
SOURCE: Ernst & Young LLP.
Table 1
Biotech Big Seven
R&D as percent Market capitalization
Company Location of sales (millions of dollars) Employees Selected products and uses
Amgen Los Angeles 26 19,108 5,308 Procrit, red blood cell enhancement
Genentech San Francisco 46 8,801 3,242 Humulin, manufactured insulin; hepatitis B vaccine
Biogen Boston 34 4,912 797 Intron, cancer and viral infections
Alza Corp. San Francisco 34 3,474 1,532 Advanced controlled dosage release for medicine
Chiron Corp. San Francisco 32 3,312 6,842 Betaseron, multiple sclerosis
Genzyme Corp. Boston 13 2,536 3,500 Tissue repair, cancer treatment and diagnostics
Immunex Corp. Seattle 58 2,228 886 Treatments for cancer, immunological disorders
NOTE: Data as of November 1998. In comparison, pharmaceutical giant Merck employs 53,800 at a market capitalization of $162 billion and devotes only 7 percent of sales to research and development.
SOURCE: Ernst & Young LLP.
SOURCE: Ernst & Young LLP.native assessment confirms those results.
Biospace.com, an industry web site,
identifies “hotbed communities” for bio-
tech. The Institute for Biotechnology 
Information maintains a corporate di-
rectory of public and private companies
by state. Combining the two sources
gives a regional picture of biotech. The
numbers in Table 2 differ slightly from
Ernst & Young’s but provide similar re-
sults. California and Massachusetts have
the highest concentrations of compa-
nies, but Texas has enough to warrant
identification and tracking.
Biotech Clusters in California and
Massachusetts. California and Massa-
chusetts have developed large numbers
of biotech companies. These two states
are home to the nation’s biotech leaders
because they have biotech clusters—
companies surrounded by sources of in-
novation and supporting institutions—
that can be traced to historical circum-
stances.
California’s—and the nation’s—first
biotech company, Genentech, was
founded in 1976 in San Francisco by
venture capitalist Robert Swanson and
Dr. Herbert Boyer of the University of
California at San Francisco. The com-
pany’s genetic engineering capabilities
stemmed from recombinant DNA tech-
nology developed by Boyer and Stan-
ford’s Stanley Cohen in 1973.
Massachusetts’ Genzyme Corp. ini-
tially benefited from the strength of the
region’s universities, medical centers and
venture capital firms. Eventually, Gen-
zyme required a manufacturing facility.
Genzyme’s president could have moved
the company to the pharmaceuticals
cluster in New Jersey and Philadelphia
that already had a strong manufacturing
base, but chose instead to cooperate
with city contractors and develop man-
ufacturing capability in Boston. Gen-
zyme also has worked with the city
government to improve the labor pool
by offering scholarships and internships
to local youth.
Biotech Clusters in Texas Cities.
Texas shows signs of nascent biotech
clusters. Nearly all Texas biotech com-
panies focus on health care and con-
centrate in four metropolitan areas. Of
the 39 public and private Texas biotech
companies tracked by Ernst & Young,
18 are located in Houston, seven in 
Dallas, five in Austin and three in San
Antonio. Table 3 details 20 Texas bio-
tech companies.
Like companies in California and
Massachusetts, Texas biotech compa-
nies benefit from proximity to educa-
tional institutions through research and
technology transfer. Technology trans-
fer occurs when a university licenses its
technology or sells it outright to com-
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Table 2
Biotech Hotbed Communities
in the United States
Number of
Community companies
Biotech Bay and Beach 308
(N. and S. Calif.)
Pharm Country 196
(N.Y., N.J., Conn., Pa.)
Genetown (Mass.) 127
BioCapital (Md., D.C., Va.) 95
Research Triangle (N.C.) 76
BioForest 60
(Wash., Ore., Mont., Idaho)
BioTechxus (Texas) 45




Company Location Employees Focus
Publicly traded
Access Pharmaceuticals Dallas 18 Cancer and canker sore therapeutics
Amarillo Bioscience Amarillo 8 Human and animal disease therapeutics
Aronex Pharmaceuticals Houston 91 Cancer and infectious disease therapeutics
Carrington Laboratories Dallas 278 Custom molecular biology services
Cytoclonal Pharmaceuticals Dallas 20 Cancer and infectious disease therapeutics
Energy Biosystems Houston 84 Petroleum industry processes
Gamma Biologicals Houston 134 In vitro diagnostics
GeneMedicine Houston 109 Gene therapy for cancer
ILEX Oncology San Antonio 180 Cancer therapeutics
LifeCell Corp. Houston 95 Tissue engineering
Texas Biotechnology Corp. Houston 81 Vascular disease therapeutics
Zonagen Houston 50 Human reproductive system therapeutics
Privately held
Ambion Austin 100 Molecular diagnostic products
Bio-Synthesis Dallas 70 Custom DNA synthesis
Diagnostic Systems Laboratories Austin 100 In vitro diagnostics
Genosys Biotechnologies Houston 165 Custom DNA synthesis
Introgen Therapeutics Austin 60 Gene therapy for cancer
Lexicon Genetics Houston 83 Functional genomics
Midland Certified Reagent Co. Midland 45 Custom molecular biology services
Tanox Houston 55 Immune system therapeutics
NOTES: This table lists public companies of all sizes and private companies with over 40 employees.
GeneMedicine has merged to form Valentis; LifeCell has announced plans to move to New Jersey.
SOURCES: Ernst & Young LLP; Texas Healthcare & Bioscience Institute; Biotechnology Industry Organization.panies for commercial development.
Table 4 lists Texas institutions and
their technology transfer organizations.
BCM Technologies, Baylor University’s
technology transfer organization, has a
portfolio of spinoffs including three of
Texas’ 12 publicly traded biotech com-
panies. The University of Texas at 
San Antonio is responsible for another.
Privately held Introgen Therapeutics 
acquired its core technologies through
licensing agreements with the Univer-
sity of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer
Center. Technology developed by the
University of North Texas Health Sci-
ence Center and the University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center enabled
the recent launching of ManTex Biotech,
funded by Canadian incubator Genesys
Venture. Of Texas biotech companies
surveyed by the Texas Healthcare and
Bioscience Institute, 55 percent say uni-
versity ties create or help growth and 
34 percent report research agreements
with Texas universities.
10
Biotech’s Potential for Growth in Texas
Texas is home to some exciting bio-
tech developments, but as an industry,
biotech is still very small. For biotech to
gain prominence in the Texas economy,
the budding biotech clusters must grow.
Clusters develop spontaneously in the
right business environment, often in the
presence of complementary industries.
Biotech clusters grow when surrounded
by the right resources; knowledge, spe-
cialized labor and capital enable com-
panies to expand and new ventures to
form. Government and institutions can-
not force biotech clusters to grow, but
they can remove barriers to growth.
Complementarities with Existing
Industries. Biotech complements Texas’
growing health care technology in-
dustry, which employed 49,000 people
in 1997 (Chart 2). The Texas health care
technology industry includes research
laboratories, pharmaceutical manufac-
turers, and medical device and equip-
ment  manufacturers. At an annual in-
dustry employment growth rate of 3
percent from 1990 to 1997, Texas is
above the national industry average of
1.7 percent.
11
Knowledge. Biotech demands a
stock of innovations, and Texas institu-
tions supply a substantial number. The
state’s patent activity in health care
technology suggests Texas innovations
initiate in-state product development.
The number of health care technology
patents issued to Texas residents in-
creased from 195 in 1990 to 375 in 1997
(Chart 3). Texas health care technology
patents cite Texas research at nearly 3.5
times the expected rate, while California
patents cite California research at 1.6
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Chart 2
Texas Health Care 
Technology Employment
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University Affiliated technology transfer organization
Baylor College of Medicine, Houston BCM Technologies
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas Dallas Biomedical Corp.
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston Institute for Technology
University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, Houston Office of Technology Development
University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio University–Industry Cooperative Research Center
University of Texas at Austin Center for Technology Development and Transfer
Texas A&M University Texas Engineering Experiment Station Technology Business Development Division
SOURCE: Texas Healthcare and Bioscience Institute.times the expected rate.
12 Texas’ health
care patent activity reveals the state as
an important source of university re-
search that results in Texas patents.
Labor. Biotech requires a highly 
specialized labor force, and although
regions can attract workers from else-
where, a local trained workforce is im-
portant. Signs that Texas is developing
its own biotech labor force include
more life science graduates and new
academic programs. Between 1989 and
1995, the number of life science degrees
awarded in Texas increased 56 percent,
from 11,306 to 17,645 (Chart 4 ). Austin
Community College recently became
one of six regional biotechnology cen-
ters funded by the National Science
Foundation as part of Bio-Link. Like the
regional centers at colleges in Madison,
Wis., Portsmouth, N.H., Seattle, Balti-
more and San Diego and the national
center in San Francisco, Austin Commu-
nity College will begin a biotech certifi-
cation program in the fall of 1999,
offering both one-year certification and
two-year associate’s degree programs.
Capital. As biotech companies
across the nation feel a capital crunch,
Texas companies are combining forces
to attract investor attention. Texas bio-
tech and medical/health-related compa-
nies received $80 million in venture
capital in 1997—2.7 percent of the U.S.
total—recovering from a drop to $11
million in 1995 (Chart 5 ).
13 In March
1999, San Mateo, Calif., biotech com-
munications firm Russell-Welsh organized
the Second Annual Texas Biomedical
Investment Conference in Houston. And
in May, the First Texas Life Sciences
Stocks Forum was held, also in Houston.
Institutional Support. Texas biotech
receives support not only from its edu-
cational institutions, but also from other
public and private institutions. The Texas
Healthcare and Bioscience Institute is a
two-year-old private consortium of bio-
tech, medical device and pharmaceuti-
cal companies, universities and private
research institutions. The institute tracks
an index of the Texas health care tech-
nology industry and coordinates state-
wide industry initiatives and educa-
tional seminars. Cities like Houston,
Fort Worth and Dallas are developing
technology business incubators to ad-
dress the unique needs of emerging
biotech firms.
Conclusion
Although Texas biotech is still small,
biotech clusters in metropolitan areas
appear to be emerging in an improving
business environment. Biotech comple-
ments the state’s growing health care
technology industry. The knowledge,
labor and capital biotech needs to grow
are being cultivated in Texas. Support is
also developing from educational insti-
tutions, local governments and industry
organizations. Whether biotech will grow
clusters in Texas comparable to those in
California and Massachusetts is impossi-
ble to predict, but the necessary condi-
tions for growth are increasingly evi-
dent. Texas is a source of biotech inno-
vations and already has a noticeable
biotech presence. The biotech bonanza,
whether a mother lode or just another
strike, indeed has prospects for Texas.
—Meredith M. Walker   Notes
Many thanks to Lori Taylor for constructive comments.
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Chart 5
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OLITICAL SUPPORT IS growing
in Congress for another hike in
the federal minimum wage. In
response to President Clinton’s
1999 State of the Union mes-
sage call for a minimum wage
increase, bills now before Congress
would raise the minimum hourly wage
by $1, from $5.15 to $6.15, in two steps
over the next year and a half.
1
The proposed increase will bring, as
always, reactions from both sides of the
aisle. Supporters and detractors in this
heated and probably unavoidable de-
bate will earnestly restate old arguments
and past claims, and again both sides
will be off course in the likely employ-
ment consequences of a minimum wage
increase. In considering a new round of
increases, all sides need to examine
how a minimum wage hike will affect
labor market incentives and how condi-
tions of employment will react to what-
ever Congress legislates.
The Minimum Wage in Current
and Constant Dollars
In the emerging debate, much will
likely be made of how the current fed-
eral minimum wage of $5.15 an hour
has no more purchasing power than the
minimum wage of the early 1950s. As
seen in Chart 1, the minimum wage in
current dollars has risen in a series of 19
steps from 25 cents an hour in October
1938, when the first federal minimum
wage took effect, to $5.15 currently.
However, in constant (February 1999)
dollars the hourly minimum wage rose
irregularly from $2.92 in October 1938
to $7.70 in 1968, then fell irregularly to
its current level of $5.15, a third less
than the 1968 peak. The real value of
the minimum wage in 1999 is slightly
below its level of $5.25 in 1999 dollars
when it was raised at the start of 1950.
In recent years, the minimum wage has
fallen only slightly in real terms, from
$5.25 in October 1997, when the mini-
mum wage was last raised, to $5.15.
2
Two Sides to an Old Debate
When the next minimum wage bill
reaches the floor of Congress, it is all
but certain that opponents and propo-
nents in and out of Congress will once
again lock political horns, no matter
what increase is proposed. Outside in-
terests, citing studies and statistics, will
stand ready to promote or denounce
the legislation. On the one side, Bob
Herbert, a New York Times columnist
and minimum wage supporter, cites a
study by Bernstein and Schmitt (1998) of
the Economic Policy Institute, a Wash-
ington, D.C.-based think tank, that finds
the last approved minimum wage hike
raised the incomes of 10 million Ameri-
cans. Herbert writes, “The benefits of the
increase disproportionately help those
working households at the bottom of
the income scale. Although households
in the bottom 20 percent (whose aver-
age income was $15,728 in 1996) re-
ceived only 5 percent of total national
income, 35 percent of the benefits from
the minimum wage increase went to
these workers. In this regard, the in-
crease had the intended effect of raising
the earnings and incomes of low-wage
workers and their households.’’
3 More-
over, in the growing debate proponents
like Herbert will continue to cite statis-
tical studies that show a minimum wage
hike will have no (or minimal) impact
on the low-wage job count, reinforcing
Bernstein and Schmitt’s findings.





























NOTES: 1938 data as of October; constant dollars based on February 1999 data.
A Commentary by Richard B. McKenzieings should give minimum wage critics
reason to eat their words. Herbert re-
minds his readers of comments by
William A. Niskanen, chairman of the
Cato Institute, former acting chairman
of President Reagan’s Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors and an opponent of
minimum wage increases, during the
previous debate over increasing the
minimum wage: “It is hard to explain
the continued support for increasing the
minimum wage by those interested in
helping the working poor’’ (Bernstein
and Schmitt 1998). Herbert and other
minimum wage supporters will point
anew to the empirical work of Prince-
ton University’s David Card and Alan
Krueger (1994, 1995), who conclude
that increases in the federal minimum
wage in the early 1990s had no measur-
able negative effect on employment in
New Jersey fast-food restaurants (and
may have increased employment slightly).
These same authors contend in a 1998
Washington Post article (Card and Krue-
ger 1998) that more recent employment
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
corroborate their earlier findings.
Nevertheless, opponents will con-
tinue to argue that if Congress raises the
cost of low-skilled labor, less than a fifth
of the wage gains will go to households
with incomes below the poverty level
and more than half of the wage gains
will go to households with more than
twice the poverty income threshold
(Couch 1999). They will also stress that
several hundred thousand jobs are
bound to be lost. Some employers will
not be able to afford as many workers,
and other employers can be expected
to automate low-skill jobs out of exis-
tence. The opponents will back up their
claims with statistics showing that some
low-skilled workers will be better off
(those who keep their jobs), but only
because other low-skilled workers will
be worse off (those who are unem-
ployed).
4 For example, a study by the
Employment Policies Institute (Macpher-
son 1998), another Washington, D.C.-
based think tank, concludes that a $1.35
increase in the minimum wage could be
expected to eliminate 7,431 jobs in the
state of Washington by 2000, causing
the affected workers to lose $64 million
in annual income.
Both sides will again err in their 
assessments of the minimum wage in-
crease because both fail to recognize
that employers are a lot smarter and are
pressed far more by labor market forces
than the legislators think. Neither side
seems to realize that Washington simply
doesn’t have the requisite power over
markets to significantly improve worker
welfare by wage decrees, no matter
how well intended the legislation may
be. This is why so many empirical 
studies show minimum wage increases
have had a relatively small impact on
employment. Indeed, most studies un-
dertaken over the past three or four
decades have found that a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage will
lower the employment of teenagers (the
group of workers most likely to be ad-
versely affected by the minimum wage)
by a surprisingly small percentage—
anywhere from 0.5 percent to 3 per-
cent.
5 Further, a tight labor market, such
as currently exists in the United States,
implies relatively smaller reductions in
the number of lost jobs with any given
percentage increase in the minimum
wage.
6 When labor economists were
asked to give their personal estimate of
the effect on employment of a 10 per-
cent increase in the minimum wage,
they projected, on average, a decline in




Why have the percentage estimates
of job losses been so low? The simple
answer is the labor markets for low-
skilled workers are highly competitive,
which explains the low wages paid
workers with limited skills in the first
place. Many employers of low-skilled
workers would love to be able to pay
their workers more, but they have to
face a market reality: if they pay more,
then their competitors would have a
cost advantage in pricing their products.
When Congress forces employers to
pay more in money wages, it causes
them to pay less in other forms, most
notably in fringe benefits. And if there
are few fringes to take away, the em-
ployers can always increase work re-
quirements.
Why would employers curb benefits
and increase work requirements? First,
because they can do it. A minimum
wage hike will attract a greater number
of workers (and workers who are more
productive). It will also cause some em-
ployers to question whether they can
hire as many workers as they currently
employ unless adjustments are made.
Hence, in a tight labor market the
forced wage hike strengthens the em-
ployers’ bargaining position. Employers
can tell prospective workers, “If you
don’t like it, I can hire someone else.
Your replacements are lined up at my
personnel office door.”
8 Employers will
make the adjustments for an offensive
reason—to improve their profits (or curb
losses).
Second, and perhaps more impor-
tant, employers of covered workers
must cut fringes and/or increase work
requirements or face the threat of losing
their market positions as their competi-
tors take these same actions. Employers
will make adjustments for defensive rea-
sons—to prevent their market rivals
from taking a portion of their markets
and causing their profits to fall (or
losses to mount).
Third, if employers don’t cut fringes
and/or increase work requirements, the
value of the company’s stock will suffer,
opening up opportunities for investors
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  9
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pay more in money
wages, it causes
them to pay less 
in other forms,
most notably in
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rate reductions. The wage-rate reductions
can be expected because if workers
value the fringes, the supply of workers
will go up, forcing the money wage rate
down.
It follows that competitive market
pressures will force firms to do what is
right by their bottom lines and their
workers. This means that when the
minimum wage is raised, the value to
the workers of the fringe benefits and
less onerous work requirements they
are forced to give up will be greater
than the value of the additional money
income.
Put another way, the workers who
retain their jobs are made worse off
(perhaps marginally so) despite the
money-wage increase. Employment in
low-skill jobs may go down (albeit ever
so slightly) in face of minimum wage in-
creases not so much because the em-
ployers don’t want to offer the jobs (as
traditionally argued), but because not as
many workers want the minimum wage
jobs that are offered.
11
Empirical Evidence
Have the expected effects been seen
in empirical studies? The most com-
pelling evidence is captured in the
many studies already cited that indicate
job losses from a minimum wage in-
crease tend to be small, even within the
worker groups most likely to be ad-
versely affected. However, other studies
over the past two decades have at-
tempted to directly assess the impact of
minimum wage increases on fringes
and work requirements, as well as the
overall value of jobs:
• Hashimoto (1982) finds that under
the 1967 minimum wage hike,
workers gained 32 cents per hour in
money income but lost 41 cents per
hour in training (a net loss of 9 cents
per hour in full-income compensa-
tion).
• Leighton and Mincer (1981) con-
clude that minimum wage in-
creases reduce on-the-job training
and, as a result, dampen growth in
the real long-run income of cov-
ered workers.
• Wessels (1987) finds that the mini-
to buy the firm, change the firm’s 
benefit/work requirements policies, 
improve the firm’s profitability and 
then sell the firm at a higher market
value. Employers—either the original or
new owners—will make the adjust-
ments for financial reasons—to maxi-
mize their firms’ share values.
9
The net effect of the adjustments in
fringes and work requirements is to
largely neutralize the cost impact of the
minimum wage hike. For example, when
the minimum wage increases by $1, the
cost of labor may, on balance, rise by
only 5 cents. Such an adjustment ex-
plains why Card and Krueger (1994,
1995) and more than a hundred other
statistical studies have found that mini-
mum wage hikes have caused a small,
if not negligible, percentage drop in
jobs even among that group of work-
ers—teenagers working at fast-food
restaurants—whose jobs are most likely
to be cut.
10
This line of argument can also help
us understand why workers who retain
their jobs are unlikely to be any better
off. They get more money, but they also
get fewer fringes and have to work
harder for their pay. The covered work-
ers who retain their jobs will be worse
off—at least marginally so—because the
only reason an employer intent on mak-
ing as much profit as possible would
offer the fringes and less onerous work
requirements in the first place is that the
workers valued the nonmonetary work
benefits more highly than they valued
the money wages they had to give up 
to get those benefits. And profit-maxi-
mizing employers aren’t about to offer
workers anything that’s costly unless they
get something in return, like greater
output per hour or a lower wage bill.
If a firm offers costly benefits that do
not lower wages or fails to offer bene-
fits that could lower wages, then that
firm becomes vulnerable to takeover.
Some savvy investor can be expected to
buy the firm, change its benefit policies
and lower wages by more than other
costs rise—thereby improving the firm’s
profitability—and then sell the firm for
a higher price.
Make no mistake about it, profit-
maximizing firms do not “give” fringes
to their workers; they require their work-
ers to pay for the fringes through wage-
Competitive market
pressures will force
firms to do what is
right by their bottom
lines and their workers.
This means that when
the minimum wage is
raised, the value to the
workers of the fringe
benefits and less
onerous work require-
ments they are forced
to give up will be
greater than the 
value of the additional
money income.From this perspective, the figures
cited by Herbert on the added income
received by 10 million workers are
grossly misleading because the figures
suggest the affected workers are better
off, which is not likely to be the case,
given their loss of fringe benefits and
their increased work requirements. The
fact that Card and Krueger (1994, 1995)
also find no loss of jobs suggests the
market may have forced nonwage ad-
justments on the fast-food restaurants
studied.
Although economists might specu-
late that the job reductions have been
small because the low-skilled labor
market exhibits a low elasticity of de-
mand (or low responsiveness among
employers to a wage hike), such an ex-
planation is hardly compelling. The de-
mand elasticity for anything, including
labor, is related to the number of sub-
stitutes the good (or labor) has: the
greater the number of substitutes, the
greater the ability of buyers (employers)
to move away from the good (labor)
when the price (wage rate) is raised
and, hence, the greater the responsive-
ness of buyers (employers), or elasticity
of demand.
The problem with this explanation is
that no labor group has more substi-
tutes than low-skilled (minimum wage)
workers, especially now that firms have
so much flexibility to automate jobs out
of existence or to replace domestic
workers with foreign workers by way 
of imports. The elasticity of demand 
for low-skilled labor must be relatively
high; hence, the relatively small decline
in the number of low-skilled workers 
in response to a minimum wage hike
points to one central conclusion: the
mandated wage hike is offset in large
measure by other adjustments in the 




This line of argument does not lead
to the conclusion that minimum wage
increases of given amounts should al-
ways have the same employment effect
no matter when they are legislated. Look-
mum wage caused retail establish-
ments in New York to increase work
requirements. In response to a
minimum wage increase, only 714
of the surveyed stores cut back
store hours, but 4,827 stores re-
duced the number of workers
and/or the hours they worked.
Thus, in most stores, fewer work-
ers were given fewer hours to do
the same work as before.
12
• Research by Fleisher (1981), Alpert
(1986) and Dunn (1985) shows that
minimum wage increases lead to
large reductions in fringe benefits and
to worsening working conditions.
If the minimum wage does not cause
employers to make substantial reduc-
tions in nonmoney benefits, then we
would expect increases in the minimum
wage to cause (1) an increase in the
labor-force participation rates of covered
workers (because workers would be
moving up their supply-of-labor curves),
(2) a reduction in the rate at which cov-
ered workers quit their jobs (because their
jobs would then be more attractive) and
(3) a significant increase in prices of
production processes heavily depen-
dent on covered minimum wage work-
ers. However, Wessels (1987) finds little
empirical support for such conclusions
drawn from conventional theory. In-
deed, in general, he finds that minimum
wage increases had the exact opposite
effect: (1) participation rates went
down, (2) quit rates went up and 
(3) prices did not rise appreciably—
findings consistent only with the view
that minimum wage increases make
workers worse off. With regard to quit
rates, Wessels writes:
I could find no industry which had
a significant decrease in their quit
rates. Two industries had a significant
increase in their quit rates….These re-
sults are only consistent with a lower
full compensation. I also found that
quit rates went up more in those in-
dustries with the average lowest wages,
the more full compensation is re-
duced. I also found that in the long
run,  several industries experienced a
significantly large increase in the quit
rate: a result only possible if minimum
wages reduce full compensation.
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  11
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to automate jobs




by way of imports.ing back at Chart 1, we might reason
that as the real minimum wage rose be-
tween 1938 and 1968, employers did
what they were pressed to do to mod-
erate their labor cost increases: take
away progressively more fringe benefits
and add progressively more work re-
quirements (compared with what they
would have done). Thus, as time passed
we would expect the employment effects
of a given minimum wage increase to
go up as 1968 approached simply be-
cause there were fewer ways for em-
ployers to adjust to the wage hike.
Conversely, as the minimum wage
fell irregularly after 1968, we would ex-
pect employers to respond by gradually
adding back more fringe benefits and
relaxing work requirements (a trend that
has likely accelerated with the increas-
ingly tight labor market in the late
1990s). The result would be that in the
1990s employers would have had more
ways to adjust to a minimum wage hike
than they had in, say, the late 1960s. As
a consequence, we should not be sur-
prised that Card and Krueger (1994,
1995) find little or no employment ef-
fect in the early 1990s, whereas studies
in the 1960s find larger effects.
13 Nor
should we be surprised if future studies
of the impact of any 1999 minimum
wage increase show similarly negligible
negative employment effects.
Conclusion
Congress and the president need to
recognize a simple fact of modern eco-
nomics: you can’t fool the market as
much as you imagine, at least not all the
time. Legislators simply do not have as
much power to manipulate markets as
they think. Thus, we can anticipate that,
once again, the chosen increase in the
minimum wage will have minimum em-
ployment consequences for two rea-
sons. First, Congress will choose a fairly
small increase in the minimum wage
because of political groups working
against the bill. Second, market forces
will largely neutralize the potential neg-
ative employment effects of whatever
wage increase is legislated.  
Notes
Richard McKenzie, author of Getting Rich in America: 8 Simple Rules
for Building a Fortune and a Satisfying Life (HarperBusiness, 1999),
is a professor in the Graduate School of Management at the Univer-
sity of California, Irvine. At the time this article was written, he was
visiting the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas.
1 The companion bills, if passed, would raise the minimum wage from
$5.15 to $5.65 per hour on September 1, 1999, and to $6.15 per
hour on September 1, 2000 (Fair Minimum Wage Act of 1999, 106th
Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 325, S.R. 192). Another bill would delay the
full $1 increase until September 1, 2001, but it would go one step
further and raise the minimum wage annually by the Consumer Price
Index after September 1, 2002 (Long Term Minimum Wage Adjust-
ment Act of 1999, 106th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 964).
2 The percentage of nonsupervisory workers covered by the federal
minimum wage rose from 57 percent in 1950 to 87 percent in 1988
(the latest year of available data). This rise in coverage should have
caused any increase in the minimum wage to have a progressively
greater negative employment effect over the years, which is what
economist Marvin Kosters finds (see Kosters 1989).
3 See Herbert (1998).
4 Several recent statistical studies on the negative employment and 
income impacts of state and federal minimum wage hikes can be
found on the Employment Policies Institute web site, <http://www.
epionline.org/research_frame.htm>.
5 For reviews of the minimum wage literature, see Brown, Gilroy and
Kohen (1982) and Brown (1988). In more recent studies in the
1990s, the reported employment effects among teenagers continue
to be relatively small (see Burkhauser and Wittenburg 1998).
6 These estimates of labor market responsiveness to minimum wage
hikes are independent of labor market tightness. If the country’s labor
markets remain relatively tight over the next year or so, the number
of low-skilled workers covered by the minimum wage can be ex-
pected to fall as market-determined wage rates for low-skilled work-
ers rise past the proposed new levels for the minimum wage.
(Currently, only about 4 million Americans work at the federal mini-
mum wage.) Hence, while the percentage reduction in the number of
minimum wage jobs may remain more or less in line with past stud-
ies, it stands to reason that the actual number of minimum wage jobs
will fall as the number of covered workers shrinks.
7 See Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba (1998).
8 Tight labor markets, like the ones in the United States in 1999, 
can cause wages and fringe benefits to rise, even for low-skilled
workers, and can cause the number of workers affected by any 
minimum wage hike to fall. However, the point that minimum wage
hikes increase the relative bargaining power of employers still holds
for those workers remaining at the minimum wage. Moreover, if 
employers have responded to their tight labor markets by increas-
ing their workers’ fringe benefits, then there will be more benefits for
employers to take away when faced with a hike in the mandated
money wage rate.
9 Indeed, it may be interesting to note that, at least conceptually, mini-
mum wage workers might contemplate the prospects of buying their
firms if their firms did not make compensation and work adjustments
and if they, the minimum wage workers, could make the purchase.
The point here is that even worker groups can see the financial bene-
fits of adjusting fringe benefits and work requirements in light of a
minimum wage increase.
10 Even the Employment Policies Institute study (Macpherson 1998),
which contains estimates of employment losses that are on the high
side of the expected range, shows a reduction in Washington’s total
employment (2.7 million workers) of less than 0.3 percent in re-
sponse to a proposed 26 percent increase in the state’s minimum
wage. It can be noted that if Washington has the average percentage
of minimum wage workers—8.8 percent—then the Macpherson
study suggests that each 10 percent increase in the minimum wage
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Legislators 
simply do not have
as much power 
to manipulate
markets as 
they think.Herbert, Bob (1998), “The Sky Didn’t Fall,” New York Times, June 4,
A27.
Kosters, Marvin H. (1989), Jobs and the Minimum Wage: The Effect of
Changes in the Level and Pattern (Washington, D.C.: American Enter-
prise Institute).
Leighton, Linda, and Jacob Mincer (1981), “Effects of Minimum Wages
on Human Capital Formation,” in The Economics of Legal Minimum
Wages, ed. Simon Rothenberg (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute), 155–73.
Macpherson, David A. (1998), “The Effects of the 1999–2000 
Washington Minimum Wage Increase” (Washington, D.C.: Employment
Policies Institute, May), as found at <http://www.epionline.org/
research_frame.htm>.
McKenzie, Richard B. (1994), Times Change: The Minimum Wage and
the New York Times (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute).
Wessels, Walter J. (1980), Minimum Wages, Fringe Benefits, and
Working Conditions (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute).
——— (1987), “Minimum Wages: Are Workers Really Better Off?”
(Paper presented at a conference on minimum wages, National Cham-
ber Foundation, Washington, D.C., July 29).
would lower the employment of covered workers by, at most, 1.2 per-
cent.
11 Granted, not all low-skilled workers have many fringe benefits that
can be taken away, and some minimum wage workers may be work-
ing very hard. The argument that is being developed suggests that
the negative employment effects of a minimum wage increase will 
be concentrated among this group of particularly disadvantaged
workers.
12 For more details, see Wessels (1980).
13 The implication of the theory that a minimum wage hike will have a
greater impact on employment when the minimum wage is high,
compared with when it is low, has not been rigorously tested. How-
ever, it is interesting to note that through the 1950s, 1960s and early
1970s the New York Times staunchly supported increases in the
minimum wage, mainly because the evidence on the negative em-
ployment effect was not strong. However, as the evidence mounted 
in the 1960s that minimum wage hikes had a negative employment
effect, especially among minority teenagers, the newspaper began to
shift its editorial stance. By the mid-1980s, it favored a minimum
wage of “$0.00.” The New York Times has since shifted its editorial
stance back to support for minimum wage hikes, mainly because the
negative employment effects have been shown to be nil in recent
studies. See McKenzie (1994).
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 SWE SWE SWE Beyond the Border Beyond the Border
HE MEGADEVALUATIONS, bank-
ing crises and continent-jumping
financial contagions of the past
two years have sent policymakers
searching for monetary programs
to insulate their countries from
such problems. In Latin America, the
dollarization option is getting consider-
able attention. It has been the subject of
debate in both Mexico and Brazil. And
the president of Argentina has been
pushing for dollarization there.
When a country officially dollarizes, it
uses only U.S. currency. All bank accounts
and loans become dollar-denominated.
Countries that adopt the dollar cannot
print money, so they must rely on taxes
to pay their debts.
Dollarization has several benefits. It is
one route to fiscal and monetary credi-
bility because it can hold down infla-
tion, maintain price stability and prob-
ably lower interest rates. Another bene-
fit is that it enables a country to avoid
the large exchange rate devaluations
that are possible whether it has flexible
or pegged rates or a currency board.
The 1990s have seen a run of col-
lapsed exchange rate regimes (Chart 1).
Dollarization is not an economic cure-
all. But because a country that adopts
the dollar cannot devalue U.S. currency,
dollarization eliminates the disruptions
that can occur both in anticipation of a
devaluation and after one.
Devaluations are part of a broader
problem—financial contagion, which
occurs when one country’s problems are
at least temporarily transmitted to other
countries, regardless of those countries’
economic conditions. An example of this
is the effect Russia’s 1998 financial crisis
had on Mexico and Argentina. Although
there was little reason to consider either
country a candidate for financial melt-
down, interest rate increases moved
through the financial systems of both.
Interest rates may have become un-
stable because the markets factored in
the likelihood of a devaluation.
But whether a contagion is irrational
or rational, investors’ perceptions of
policy credibility can trigger capital 
outflows and exchange rate crises. In-
vestors may anticipate that governments
will cheat on their commitments to 
stable monetary and fiscal policy, and
they may fear that other investors share
their suspicions. Consequently, invest-
ors often pull out en masse, triggering a
sharp reduction in demand that can set
off a currency crash and a sudden drop
in asset prices.
Supporters of dollarization say it is
one way to avoid some capital out-
flows—at least those that occur in an-
ticipation of a currency crash. Dollariza-
tion ties policymakers’ hands, prevent-
ing them from running up deficits that
would have to be paid for with infla-
tionary financing. 
Dollarization Drawbacks
Dollarization, however, has its costs.
A dollarized country cannot conduct its
own monetary policy but instead has to
follow the Federal Reserve Board’s poli-
cies. A dollarized currency regime limits
a government’s ability to serve as a
lender of last resort in a banking crisis.
Dollarized countries cannot create
money to rescue the banking system
because they can’t create dollars at all.
A dollarized country also sacrifices its
seigniorage, which is the profit a coun-
try makes from printing money. It costs
three cents to print a $100 bill, but that
bill can purchase $100 worth of goods
and services. In a nondollarized economy,
the central bank holds international re-
serves in interest-bearing instruments,
such as U.S. Treasury bills. Under dol-
larization, a country loses the interest
earned from these types of instruments.
U.S. territories such as Guam and
American Samoa are dollarized, as are the
Marshall Islands and Micronesia. Panama
is the only Latin American country that
has officially dollarized, but unofficial
dollarization is common. The value of
dollar bank deposits is greater than that
of domestic currency deposits in Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay.
Argentina has all but officially dollar-
ized. In 1991, the country adopted a
convertibility plan that would force the
government to abandon inflationary
spending and convince investors policy-
makers were committed to this course.
Not only is the Argentine peso fixed to
the dollar, but bank accounts can be
converted to dollars, which can be used
to make purchases. (Wages and taxes
must still be paid in pesos.) Argentine
President Carlos Menem has been
pressing for full, official dollarization.
If additional countries opt for official
dollarization, the already high foreign
demand for dollars would go even
higher. The United States would have to
print more money but would benefit
from the seigniorage.
Dollarization is not the only route to
fiscal and monetary credibility, price
stability and low inflation. But its sup-
porters argue that it may be a more vi-
able route than others.
— William C. Gruben
Sherry L. Kiser
Hey, Mr. Greenspan, Can You Spare a Dollar?
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Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
Thousands of persons Index, 1987 = 100 March–May 1999
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
HE DISTRICT ECONOMY continues to grow, albeit at
a more modest pace than a year ago. Seasonally ad-
justed employment rose at an annual rate of 2 percent
in April and 2.5 percent in May, down from 2.9 per-
cent in the first quarter. The service sector is still add-
ing jobs at a strong pace, but low commodity prices
continue to hurt the manufacturing and energy industries, and
the region’s booming construction industry is cooling.
After surging in the first quarter, Texas construction con-
tract values and housing permits came down to earth in April.
Total contract values fell at an annualized rate of 24 percent,
led by a steep decline in nonresidential building construction.
Housing permits fell 23.5 percent. Construction employment
fell at an annualized rate of 3.4 percent in May after rising at
an annualized rate of 9.4 percent in the first four months of
the year. Contacts in the real estate community continue to ex-
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI** Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
5/99 122.8 127.4 153.6 522.6 1,104.6 1,523.2 5,840.4 9,144.4 1,904.5 730.2
4/99 123.6 127.0 154.6 524.1 1,105.2 1,521.3 5,820.6 9,125.8 1,905.1 731.5
3/99 121.9 127.2 157.9 519.6 1,106.5 1,521.2 5,805.3 9,110.5 1,896.9 730.0
2/99 121.7 127.2 158.8 518.6 1,108.5 1,518.1 5,789.1 9,093.1 1,897.8 727.6
1/99 121.8 127.2 159.5 513.7 1,110.2 1,516.8 5,772.1 9,072.3 1,897.6 729.0
12/98 121.3 127.6 161.8 509.0 1,111.0 1,511.2 5,752.3 9,045.3 1,903.5 724.4
11/98 120.7 128.3 162.2 507.7 1,111.3 1,509.7 5,736.7 9,027.6 1,899.6 724.1
10/98 122.3 128.6 163.7 505.2 1,112.3 1,505.6 5,719.0 9,005.8 1,895.3 722.7
9/98 120.4 129.1 165.0 502.2 1,113.3 1,502.5 5,706.1 8,989.1 1,895.7 721.1
8/98 120.8 129.7 165.8 500.0 1,111.1 1,506.6 5,690.8 8,974.3 1,894.2 721.4
7/98 123.3 129.9 166.9 498.3 1,108.7 1,495.0 5,673.6 8,942.5 1,895.7 721.2
6/98 123.7 129.7 167.9 493.7 1,108.6 1,497.6 5,652.0 8,919.8 1,891.8 720.8
* in thousands
** Texas Industrial Production Index
 
press concern about some overbuilding, however.
Energy activity has not increased much with higher oil prices,
although there is increased optimism about the second half of
this year. U.S. output is expected to rise by at least 400,000
barrels per day if oil prices remain at their current levels. Still,
oil prices will come down as fast as they went up if OPEC
does not hold together. Although OPEC’s output agreement
seems to be holding up, fiscal and supply pressures may cause
a break in the agreement. The Venezuelan and Mexican econo-
mies are suffering from low oil revenues and may be com-
pelled to revise their output cuts. On the supply side, Iraqi oil
production will rise as its output ceilings are raised in the
United Nations’ oil-for-food program. Higher oil prices will
bring increased supply from other non-OPEC producers as
well, putting downward pressure on prices.
—Fiona SigallaSWE SWE SWE Upcoming Event Upcoming Event
Economic Development Conference
August 20, 1999
Omni San Antonio Hotel, San Antonio
What policies are best to achieve economic opportunity and a high quality of life for urban citizens? Are targeted
industry tax breaks efficient? Should cities aim to reduce urban sprawl? Are proactive approaches to planning
always necessary? Join economic development officials, city planners, economists and other experts in regional
growth at a one-day conference sponsored by the San Antonio Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
For more information, call Rachel Peña at (210) 978-1663 or e-mail rachel.pena@dal.frb.org.
Can Cities Control Their Destiny?